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1. Introduction 
During the recent (2007-2009) financial crisis, GDP growth and stock markets collapsed 
simultaneously in most countries around the globe. Yet, the crisis was triggered by a 
financial shock in the US, namely an unanticipated fall in US house prices that led to 
massive mortgage loan defaults by US households, and thus impaired the health of US 
and foreign banks that had invested in the US mortgage market. Earlier episodes of 
‘financial contagion’ included the 1997-1998 crises, during which financial troubles that 
originated in Asia and Russia rapidly spread to other Emerging Market economies. The 
1997-1998 crises spawned a sizable empirical and theoretical literature on mechanisms 
by which a financial crisis is strongly and rapidly transmitted across countries. That 
literature highlights that contagion may occur through a variety of channels (trade 
linkages, credit flows, changes in investor sentiment etc.). It points out that financial 
frictions are needed for financial strains to disrupt real activity. For in the theoretical 
world of frictionless financial markets, the financial side of the economy is a veil only, 
and risks are hedged efficiently. Hence, a shock to any individual may be transmitted to 
all others, but there is nothing wrong with this. But with financial frictions, risk sharing is 
incomplete, and financial shocks spill over to real activity.  
 This paper discusses recent theories of ‘financial contagion’ in which balance 
sheets of global banks (and other financial institutions) are the key channel of 
international transmission. This is motivated by the fact that the 2007-2009 crisis in the 
US mortgage market was transmitted to the rest of the world through cross-country 
banking linkages. By contrast to earlier contagion episodes, linkages due to international 
goods trade were of secondary importance in the global spread of the 2007-2009 crisis 
(countries with close trade links with the US did not suffer more than countries with 
weaker trade links to the US).  
 Empirically, the bulk of bank assets is financed by short-term debt; banks’ own 
funds (bank capital) only account for a small fraction of total assets. Furthermore, bank 
assets generally have a longer maturity and are less liquid than bank liabilities. This is a 
source of fragility that magnifies the effect of crises. In a globalized financial system, 
banks hold domestic and foreign securities (stocks, bonds), and they lend to domestic and 
foreign households and firms; banks in different countries also lend to each other. An 
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adverse macroeconomic or financial shock in one country that lowers the capital of 
global banks may thus trigger a global asset sell-off and a global decrease in bank 
lending (credit crunch), provoking a global recession.  
 These channels of contagion are further explained below. Section 2 discusses 
international contagion due to portfolio adjustments of global banks, in response to an 
asset price shock in one country. Section 3 considers the role of the interbank linkage for 
international contagion. Section 4 discusses bank runs and self-fulfilling international 
financial crises.  
 
2. Bank balance sheet adjustments as a channel of contagion: the international 
financial multiplier 
Financial intermediaries, henceforth referred to as ‘banks’, make loans and invest in 
securities and other assets (e.g., real estate). They fund their asset holdings by taking 
deposits and issuing other forms of debt (mostly short-term), and using the bank’s own 
funds (bank capital): Assets = Debt + Capital. A key constraint on bank activities is that 
banks have to back at least a fraction of their assets by bank capital: Capital/Assets ≥ k, 
for some coefficient 0<k<1. Hence, only a maximum fraction 1-k of bank asset holdings 
can be funded by debt. A constraint of this type is known as a ‘bank capital requirement’. 
It can reflect a regulatory (legal) requirement, or market pressures. Bank capital 
requirements protect the interests of bank creditors. For bank capital is a buffer against a 
fall in the value of bank assets, and thus lowers the risk of insolvency. Also capital 
requirements help to limit moral hazard by bankers. A simple story is that bankers can 
walk away with a fraction k of bank assets without prosecution (and start a new life next 
period). Banks will then only be able to borrow if bank capital does not fall below a 
fraction k of assets.  
 The ratio of a bank’s capital to her assets is called the ‘capital ratio’; the inverse 
of the capital ratio is the ‘leverage ratio’. If the expected return on bank assets exceeds 
the interest rate on bank debt, then banks have an incentive to borrow the maximum 
amount, and thus the capital ratio will stay close to the required capital ratio k. 
Empirically, the capital ratios of the major European banks and of major US investment 
banks have typically ranged between 3% and 5% in the period 1995-2010, while the 
capital ratios of US commercial banks have generally been in the range of 7%-8%.  
 4
 As shown below, low capital ratios imply that asset price changes may trigger 
sizable adjustments of banks’ asset holdings and debt positions. When banks are globally 
active, then local (country-specific) shocks can hence induce sharp and synchronized 
world-wide asset price changes. Those asset price movements can feed into real activity, 
and thus induce global booms and recessions. In an influential 2008 paper, Paul Krugman 
refers to this mechanism as the ‘international financial multiplier’. This mechanism has 
become more and more powerful in recent decades, as the banking industry has become 
globalized. For example, external assets and liabilities of US banks (each) represented 
about 30% of US GDP in 2009; for Germany, France and the UK, external bank assets 
and liabilities represent more than 100% of domestic GDP.  
 Consider the following numerical example of a world with two countries of equal 
size, called Home and Foreign (the countries can be viewed as the European Union and 
the US, respectively). There is a (representative) global bank that holds both Home and 
Foreign assets (loans, stocks, bonds), and takes deposits from Home and Foreign 
households. The bank wishes to allocate 50% of her total assets to Home (Foreign) assets. 
Let k=0.05, i.e. the bank has to fund at least 5% of her assets using capital. Assume that, 
initially, the bank holds Home and Foreign assets both worth 50, that her debt is 95, and 
her capital 5. The initial balance sheet of the global bank is thus:  
                                                 Assets                           Liabilities 
                                               Home:   50                        Debt:   95                                 
                                               Foreign: 50                       Capital: 5                     
 
Consider now what happens when the value of the bank’s Home assets drops by 0.5 (i.e. 
by 1%). This might be due to bad news about the future profits (dividends) of Home 
firms, which lowers the Home stock price; it could also be due to Home credit losses, i.e. 
defaults by Home households or firms on loans received from the global bank. As a result 
of this shock, the bank’s capital drops to 4.5, i.e. the bank’s new balance sheet becomes: 
                                                 Assets                           Liabilities 
                                               Home:   49.5                     Debt:     95                                 
                                               Foreign: 50                       Capital: 4.5      
 
Note that Bank capital falls by a much larger percentage (-10%) than the fall in total  
assets (-0.5%). The bank’s capital ratio is now 4.5/99.5=4.52%, which is smaller than the 
target ratio (5%).  
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 Unless the bank’s shareholders provide new capital to the bank, the bank has to 
reduce her debt and her total assets by 9.5, i.e. total assets and debt have to fall to 90 and 
85.5, respectively--as then the capital ratio is again 5%. Assuming that the bank continues 
to allocate 50% of her total assets to Home assets, the adjusted balance sheet is:  
                                                 Assets                           Liabilities 
                                               Home:   45                        Debt:     85.5                                 
                                               Foreign: 45                       Capital:  4.5     
 
Thus, the initial 1% fall in the value of Home assets has triggered a much bigger 
simultaneous reduction of the bank’s Home and Foreign asset holdings and of her debt    
(-10%, relative to the initial balance sheet).   
 The sale of Home and Foreign assets by the global bank is likely to lead to a 
(further) fall in Home and Foreign asset prices, which then can lead to an additional 
round of Home and Foreign asset sales etc. This is likely to reduce Home and Foreign 
real activity. The spill over into the real economy may be due to the fact that the asset 
sell-off makes it harder for firms to fund physical investment projects and to obtain 
working capital; it also limits the supply of consumption and mortgage loans to 
households. Investment and consumption will fall thus, which lowers output. A general 
equilibrium model is needed for a rigorous analysis of these feedback effects (see 
below).1 An equivalent vicious circle of global asset sales and falling asset prices can 
also be triggered by an adverse shock that induces depositors (or other bank creditors) in 
one country to withdraw their funds from the global bank. Of course, a similar powerful 
effect also operates when asset values rise. In our numerical example, an initial 1% rise 
in the value of Home assets will, on impact, raise the bank’s capital to 5.5, and her capital 
ratio to 5.47%. In order to again reach a 5% capital ratio, the bank then has to increase 
her holdings of Home and Foreign assets and her debt by 10% (compared to the initial 
situation).  
 Much recent research has been devoted to building quantitative dynamic general 
equilibrium models with the mechanisms that were just described. Devereux and Yetman 
(2011) present a model of a two-country world with cross-country trade in equity (claims 
                                                 
1 A general equilibrium set-up is also required for an account of who buys the assets sold by banks. The 
buyers are likely to be less productive at managing those assets, which too contributes to the drop in 
aggregate output.  
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to physical capital), and in one-period bonds. Within each country there are patient 
households who save, and impatient households who invest. Investors (who resemble 
banks) hold domestic and foreign equity, and they face a capital requirement (i.e. 
maximum debt depends on investor net worth). When the capital requirement does not 
bind, then the international transmission of macroeconomics shocks is very limited. By 
contrast, with binding capital requirements, balance sheet linkages across banks generate 
a powerful mechanism for the international transmission of shocks. Kollmann et al. 
(2010) model the international transmission of defaults on bank loans. A two-country 
world is considered, in which global banks collect deposits from households, and lend to 
entrepreneurs, in both countries. An unanticipated loan default in one country brings 
about a wealth transfer from banks to entrepreneurs; hence bank capital falls, which 
impairs the bank’s ability to channel funds from savers to borrowers. The deposit rate 
falls while the loan rate rises, in both countries, thus lowering lending, investment and 
output in both countries. The important insight is that a credit loss (default) in one 
country triggers an immediate and identical fall in both domestic and foreign output.  
 
3. Financial contagion through interbank linkages 
The recent financial crisis has revealed that interbank borrowing and lending is a key 
channel of international contagion. Because depositors have a preference for liquidity, 
deposits are generally available “on demand” (demand deposits). But most bank loans 
have a longer maturity (mortgage loans for instance). The reason why banks can engage 
in such a “maturity transformation” is that normally not all depositors withdraw their 
funds at the same time (one may think that, on average, withdrawals are compensated by 
new deposits). Still, banks must be able to cope with unexpected large withdrawals. For 
this reason, banks hold a fraction of their assets in cash or other liquid assets (i.e. in assets 
that can easily and rapidly be turned into cash).  When choosing her holdings of liquid 
reserves, a bank faces the following trade-off: on the one hand, any Euro held in reserves 
earns the bank less interest than loans; on the other hand, if the bank does not hold 
enough reserves to face unexpected high withdrawals, it will have to sell less liquid assets 
on short notice, often at “fire sale” prices. Banks may respond to this uncertainty by 
holding demand deposits in other banks. Such cross-holdings of deposits allow banks to 
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re-allocate cash among themselves, according to their respective liquidity needs. That 
mechanism improves the efficiency of the banking system: for a given total liquid assets 
held by the banking system, each bank will be able to cope with larger idiosyncratic 
deposit withdrawals. Banks thus need lower total reserves to hedge against a given 
amount of withdrawal risk by households. Hence, they can issue more loans, which raises 
real activity.  
 This logic holds for banks within a country, but also across banks in different 
countries, as deposit withdrawals are likely to be imperfectly correlated across countries. 
Imagine, for example, that there is a natural disaster in one country and that its residents 
draw on their deposits at the local banks to fund unanticipated spending. This is likely to 
be independent of deposit withdrawals by households in other countries. Banks in the 
country in which the disaster occurs can more easily meet deposit withdrawals if they 
hold deposits in foreign banks. International cross-holdings of deposit thus facilitate 
international risk sharing, but they also imply that an unexpected withdrawal in one 
country may impact on real activity in other countries. For instance, a bank could be 
forced to cut its lending in order to fulfill its obligations towards her foreign counterparts. 
Also, for the reasons explained above, banks may end up holding less total liquid assets 
when there is risk-sharing via interbank linkages. This implies that a system of global 
interbank linkages is more resistant to a local increase in withdrawals, but that it may be 
less able to resist infrequent global shocks. Global crises might hence be magnified by 
cross-country interbank linkages. In this respect, the precise structure of the interbank 
linkages is crucial. A network in which all banks are directly linked to each other is most 
resilient. If setting up such a network is too costly, then it is preferable to have a series of 
smaller networks, rather than a ‘chain’ that indirectly connects all banks. The intuition for 
this is that, in a ‘chain’, if a bank faces a negative shock, it might force the next bank in 
the chain to liquidate assets at fire-sale values; this, in turn, can trigger fire-sales by 
another bank, and so on and so forth; hence, a smaller initial shock suffices to bring about 
the collapse of the entire system (than in a ‘complete network’).  
 The notion of balance sheet contagion has several other applications that are 
explored in the next section.  
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4. Bank-runs and self-fulfilling international crises 
The maturity mismatch of bank balance sheets exposes banks to the risk of  ‘bank-runs’, 
which can lead to self-fulfilling international financial crises.  
 As explained above, banks are able to borrow short-term and lend long-term 
because, in normal times, not all deposits are withdrawn at the same time. A run occurs 
when depositors panic and try to withdraw their money simultaneously. Imagine you are 
a depositor, and that you do not need your money now, and thus have no fundamental 
reason to withdraw. However, you know that if all depositors demand their money back 
at the same time, then the bank will be in trouble: it will have to sell its assets at fire-sale 
price, which might imply that the bank would fail. Whether you should withdraw 
depends thus on your expectations about the behavior of other depositors. This can lead 
to two possible outcomes. A no-bank-run equilibrium: expecting that no-one will 
withdraw, you are better-off not withdrawing; this is true also for others depositors; 
hence, no-one withdraws. There is also a bank-run equilibrium: expecting others to run, 
you are better-off running as well--if you wait, the bank will deplete her assets, and fail, 
before you show up; this is of course true for other depositors too, and a “bank run” can 
thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 This simple story applies too to emerging market countries. Note that these 
countries usually borrow short-term to finance longer term projects. They hence face the 
risk of a run. A run on a country is usually called a “sudden-stop” (of capital inflows). 
The basic story can also be enriched to study the cross-country contagion of self-fulfilling 
crisis.  
 Consider for instance two countries, each with a bank, and imagine that all 
depositors decide to run in the first country. If depositors in the other country believe that 
this will lead to a run in their country too, there will be a run. However, if depositors 
think the opposite, there will be no run. Note that this is the case even if the two countries 
are autarkic. This purely self-fulfilling equilibrium is therefore consistent with both 
international contagion and the absence of contagion. In reality, though, bank runs (or 
sudden-stops) usually follow the disclosure of some unfavorable news about economic 
fundamentals. Formal models of runs show that there is generally a threshold for the 
liquid reserves of the bank (or the economy) below which a run can occur. The bank run 
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threshold theory is useful for thinking about contagion because, when the same investors 
lend to banks in different countries, then a run in one country can affect the likelihood of 
a bank run in other countries. Assume for instance that there is a run in the first country, 
and that investors loose a substantial amount of money. Then, they might be more 
concerned about facing the risk of a run in the second one, and as a result a run in the 
second country becomes more likely. This can, for instance, happen when investors have 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, which implies that losses make them more risk averse. 
This story applies also to speculative attacks on an exchange rate peg. Imagine that 
speculators successfully attack the peg of a first country and thereby make sizable profits. 
Then they will be more eager to attack the currency peg of another country. Note that this 
mechanism also works the other way around: a failed attack decreases the probability of a 
successful attack on another currency peg.  
 
 
Further Reading 
Adrian, T. and Shin, H.S. (2008). Liquidity and financial contagion. Banque de France 
 Stability Review 11, 1-7 
Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2001). Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy  108, 1–33. 
Bacchetta, P. and van Wincoop, E. (2010). Explaining sudden spikes in global risk,  
 Working Paper, University of Lausanne.  
Bacchetta, P., Tille, C. and van Wincoop, E. (2010). On the Dynamics of Leverage, 
Liquidity, and Risk, Working Paper, University of Lausanne. 
Cetorelli, N. and Goldberg, L. S. (2010). Global banks and international shock 
 transmission: Evidence from the crisis. Working Paper 15974, National Bureau 
 of Economic Research, Cambridge (MA), USA, www.nber.org 
Castiglionesi, F., Feriozzi, F. and Lorenzoni, G. (2010). “Financial Integration and 
Liquidity Crises”. Mimeo. 
Claessens, S. and Forbes, K. (eds.) (2001). International financial contagion. Boston, 
 Dordrecht  and London: Kluwer Academic. 
Dedola, L. and Lombardo, G. (2010). Financial frictions, financial integration and the 
 international propagation of shocks. Working Paper, European Central Bank.  
 10
Devereux, M. B. and Yetman, J. (2010). Leverage constraints and the international 
 transmission of shocks. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42: 71-105. 
Diamond, D. and Dybvig, P. (183). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal 
 of  Political Economy 91, 401–419. 
Dornbusch, P., Park, Y. and Claessens, S. (2000). Contagion: understanding how it 
 spreads. The World Bank Research Observer 15, 177-97. 
Goldstein, I, and Pauzner, A. (2004). Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to 
 diversification of investment portfolios. Journal of Economic Theory 119, 151–183. 
Kaminsky, G., Reinhart, C. and Vegh, C. (2003). The unholy trinity of financial  
 contagion.  Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 51–74. 
Kollmann, R., Enders, Z. and Müller, G. (2010). Global banking and international 
 business cycles. Discussion Paper 7972, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
 London, UK, www.cepr.org  
Krugman, Paul, 2008, The international finance multiplier. Working Paper, Princeton 
 University.  
Malherbe, F. (2010). Self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. National Bank of Belgium, 
 Research series. 
 
